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Abstract: 11 
There is now a wealth of model-based evidence on the technology choices, costs and other impacts 12 
(such as fossil fuel demand) associated with mitigation towards stringent climate targets. Results 13 
from over 900 hundred scenarios have been reviewed in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on 14 
Climate Change Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) including baseline scenarios under which no 15 
mitigation action is taken, as well as those under which different limits to global warming are 16 
targeted. A number of additional studies have been undertaken in order to assess the implications of 17 
global mitigation action. The objective of the paper is to provide a concise overview and comparison 18 
of major input assumptions and outputs of recent studies focused on mitigating to the most 19 
stringent targets explored, which means around the 2°C level of global average temperature 20 
increase by 2100. The paper extracts key messages grouped into four pillars: mitigation costs, 21 
technology uncertainty, policy constraints, and co-benefits. The principal findings from this 22 
comparison are that, according to the models, mitigation to 2°C is feasible, but delayed action, the 23 
absence or limited deployment of any of a number of key technologies (including nuclear, CCS, wind 24 
and solar), and limited progress on energy efficiency, all make mitigation more costly and in many 25 
models infeasible. Further, rapid mitigation following delayed action leads to potentially thousands 26 
of idle fossil fuel plants globally, posing distributional and political economy challenges.  27 
  28 
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1) Introduction: 29 
 30 
In March 1994 the UNFCCC entered into force and recognised that it is necessary to stabilize 31 
atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous 32 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system [1]. A consensus between stakeholders in 33 
Copenhagen in 2009 [2] concluded that to comply with this goal the warming achieved should be 34 
limited to below 2°C compared with preindustrial times. In 2015, the Paris Agreement, to the 35 
surprise of many, included text on limiting warming to “well below” 2°C and to “pursue efforts” to 36 
limit it to less than 1.5°C [3].   37 
There has been a great deal of analysis to consider whether the mitigation commitments (or 38 
‘Copenhagen pledges’) made to date are consistent with achieving a 50:50 chance of limiting the 39 
surface temperature rise to 2°C (UNEP objective [4]) with the conclusion that the scenarios including 40 
these near term pledges are not least-cost optimal pathways  [5]. Many authors argue that with 41 
further ambitious global policies, the target is reachable ([6]; [7]; [8]), although others suggest it 42 
could be too late, as we are already locked into a fossil based energy system under the weaker-than-43 
optimal “Copenhagen pledges” ([9]; [10]). 44 
Part of the reason for this dichotomy of views is that the complexity of the climate system, as well as 45 
the extent of uncertainties embedded in it, gives rise to a wide variety of possible emission 46 
trajectories that are consistent with a 2°C temperature rise. The additional uncertainties and 47 
complexities with modelling the global energy system lead to an even wider range of views on 48 
whether, or how, such cuts in emissions are possible. 49 
This paper reviews recent major studies that analysed the latest GHG emission pathways that are 50 
compatible with limiting average global temperature rise to levels close to 2°C by the end of the 21st 51 
century. The objective of this paper is to provide a concise, systematic summary of key metrics on 52 
climate change mitigation to scholars, by extracting key messages under the following four pillars: 53 
mitigation costs (Section 4), technology uncertainty (Section 5), policy constraints (Section 6), and 54 
co-benefits (Section 7).  55 
In section 2 we first present the studies covered and models and assumptions that have been used 56 
in the selected studies covered. In section 3 we examine the global pathways to comply with 57 
targeted temperature rise and survey the technologies needed as well as the implied rates of 58 
deployment for a number of key electricity decarbonisation technologies. In section 4 we consider 59 
the costs and feasibility of the target. In section 5 we study the target feasibility under restricted 60 
availability of specific technologies. In section 6 we focus on the effects of delay in beginning global 61 
mitigation action on the pathways, the technological development and the costs induced by the 62 
delay. In section 7 we discuss the wider impacts (particularly co-benefits) of mitigation, as well as 63 
suggesting areas worthy of further investigation. Section 8 concludes by highlighting the most policy-64 
relevant points emerging from these studies. 65 
2)  Models and assumptions used for the different studies included. 66 
 67 
2.1) Studies covered 68 
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A number of recent studies and model inter-comparisons are included in the analysis: Energy 69 
Modelling Forum 27 Study1 (EMF27), Low climate IMpact scenarios and the Implications of required 70 
Tight emission control Strategies2 (LIMITS), Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways and 71 
Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost Estimates3 (AMPERE), Global Energy Assessment: 72 
Toward a Sustainable Future4 (GEA), The Roadmaps towards Sustainable Energy futures5 (RoSE) and 73 
TIAM-UCL global modelling studies: The CCC 2013 report6  and UKERC Global study 20147 (TIAM-74 
UCL) and the RCP 2.6 scenario8 (RCP2.6). In addition to these studies, the evaluations of two large 75 
assessment reports are also used in this paper:  Climate Change 2014, Mitigation of Climate Change9 76 
(IPCC 2014) and The UNEP Emissions Gap Report 201210 (UNEP 2012). The assessment reports 77 
compile and compare in detail and at length the results from different studies, most of them 78 
included in the list above. These results include reference scenarios (no mitigation policies) and 79 
different levels of climate targets from 1.5 to 4°C – although it should be noted that the majority of 80 
the most stringent scenarios are focused on 2°C, with very few achieving close to 1.5°C. 81 
The results and conclusion of these major studies have been widely published in peer-reviewed 82 
papers as well as scientific and assessments reports. However, to our knowledge a comprehensive 83 
yet concise review of the key features of the model inputs and outputs has not yet been published. . 84 
This review paper focuses only on the 2°C target compared to the reference pathways, to reflect the 85 
policy-relevance of this target to international negotiations; it integrates the key components and 86 
discusses the main conclusions of these research studies.  87 
For the specific target of 2°C, the majority of mitigation scenarios assessed over recent years have 88 
focused on GHG pathways broadly consistent with achieving atmospheric concentrations of GHGs 89 
between 450 ppm and 500 ppm [11]. However, as already discussed, there remains uncertainty in 90 
the relationship between atmospheric GHG concentrations and long-term temperature changes, 91 
broadly speaking the 450 scenarios are aimed at achieving an even or better chance of limiting 92 
surface warming to 2°C.  93 
2.2) Models included in this review. 94 
The models incorporated in the major studies analysing the transition pathways to the 2°C target are 95 
listed in Table 1, along with some of their characteristics. As seen in the last column of the table, 96 
some models have been involved in more than one study. The studies examined assumed a range of 97 
values for global population increase and economic growth, with a higher variation noted in the 98 
range of economic growth estimates than that of population between the studies.  This is, in part, 99 
due to there being more uncertainties in estimating economic growth than population increase.  100 
 101 
                                                          
1 https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-27-global-model-comparison-exercise 
2 http://www.feem-project.net/limits/ 
3 http://ampere-project.eu 
4 http://www.globalenergyassessment.org/ 
5 http://www.rose-project.org 
6 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/TIAM-UCL_global_energy_modelling_2013.pdf 
7 http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/UK+Energy+in+a+Global+Context+Ext&structure=Research 
8 http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at:8787/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=welcome 
9 http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/ 
10 http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf 
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Table 1: List of models included in the review: 102 
Model name 
Model 
category 
Solution 
Algorithm 
Coverage of 
greenhouse gases Study participation 
AIM / AIM-
Enduse* 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Recursive 
dynamic 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE 
BET 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
CO2 EMF27 
China 
MARKAL* 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Dynamic  linear 
optimisation 
CO2 RoSE 
DNE21+* 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents EMF27, AMPERE 
GCAM / 
GCAM-IIM 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE, RoSE 
EC-IAM 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
Kyoto gases from 
fossil fuel combustion 
and industry 
EMF27 
ENV-
Linkages* 
general 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic 
Kyoto gases EMF27, UNEP2012 
FARM 
general 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic 
CO2 from fossil fuel 
combustion and 
industry 
EMF27 
GAINS 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents UNEP2012E 
GEM-E3 
general 
equilibrium  
Recursive 
dynamic  
All GHGs  AMPERE 
GRAPE 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents EMF27 
IMACLIM 
general 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic 
CO2 from fossil fuel 
combustion and 
industry 
EMF27, AMPERE 
IMAGE / 
TIMER/FAIR 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Recursive 
dynamic 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE, GEA, 
UNEP2012, RCP2.6 
                                                          
* The reported time horizon for these models is 2050 instead of the usual 2100; however the pathways to 2050 
are in agreement with a 2°C target in 2100. 
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IPAC 
Multi-
model 
framework 
links several 
models 
All GHGs 
 
RoSE 
MERGE/MER
GE-ETL 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, AMPERE, 
RoSE 
MESSAGE-
MACRO 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE, GEA 
Phoenix* 
general 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic 
CO2 from fossil fuel 
combustion and 
industry 
EMF27 
POLES 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Recursive 
dynamic 
Kyoto gases from 
fossil fuel combustion 
and industry 
EMF27, AMPERE 
REMIND 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
All GHGs and other 
radiative agents 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE, RoSE 
TIAM-ECN 
Partial 
Equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
CO2, CH4, N2O. LIMITS 
TIAM-UCL 
Partial 
Equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
CO2, CH4, N2O. UKERC2014 
TIAM-World 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Intertemporal 
optimization 
Kyoto gases with the 
exception of F-Gases EMF27 
WITCH 
General 
equilibrium 
Intertemporal 
optimization 
Kyoto gases 
EMF27, LIMITS, 
AMPERE, RoSE, 
UNEP2012 
WorldScan 
general 
equilibrium 
Recursive 
dynamic  
CO2, CH4, N2O. AMPERE 
 103 
2.3) Socio-economic assumptions. 104 
Estimated population growth 105 
In most studies, 2050 population is estimated at around 9 billion while 2100 population assumptions 106 
vary from 9.1 billion (LIMITS and RCP 2.6) to 10 billion (AMPERE). Within the EMF 27 project 107 
variation in population growth assumptions exists between models, as no socioeconomic 108 
harmonisation was carried out. As reported in [12] the population and economic growth have been 109 
varied in combination with GDP within the RoSE project; the population varies from a scenario with 110 
peak at 9.4 billion in 2070 under a medium growth to a high growth scenario reaching 14 billion in 111 
2100. Most of these studies did not explicitly discuss future urbanisation rates, which is one of the 112 
key drivers that contribute to increasing per capita energy consumption and consequently emissions, 113 
especially in the emerging economies in the near and medium term and in developing countries in 114 
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the medium- and long-term. As of 2011, more than 52% of the global population lives in urban areas 115 
whilst in 2006, urban areas accounted for 67–76% of energy use and 71–76% of energy‐related CO2 116 
emissions; by 2050, the urban population is expected to increase to 5.6–7.1 billion, or 64–69% of 117 
world population [13].  118 
Estimated economic growth 119 
Global studies such as UNEP Emissions Gap Report [5] and Global Energy Assessment 2012 [14]) 120 
assume per capita GDP growth of 2% per year to 2050, mostly driven by developing countries, while 121 
the TIAM-UCL and AMPERE studies assume slightly higher growth rates of 2.4% and 2.7% 122 
respectively. EMF 27 assumes an average growth rate of 1% per year to 2100. The RoSE project 123 
assumes 3 different growth rates (slow, medium and fast) ranging from 1.6% to 2.7% [15]. The 124 
projections of economic growth used in the studies for the mitigation scenarios (to 450 ppm) are 125 
presented in figure 1; the data have been extracted from the AR5 database described in [16]. 126 
 127 
Figure 1: Projected total world GDP in the AR5 database (represented: median, 25% and 128 
75% percentile and minimum maximum). 129 
 130 
3)  Is the 2°C target achievable? What are the technologies needed? 131 
 132 
We have studied the scenarios that are broadly consistent with a 2°C target. It should be noted that 133 
all these scenarios represent ambitious goals with dramatic changes in anthropogenic GHG 134 
emissions. There are however limitations to comparing scenarios. Comparing the findings of 135 
different scenarios can be difficult; in part due to the variety of ways the targets within different 136 
studies are set. Targets used by studies include:  137 
• a maximum temperature in 2100 [4]; 138 
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• a Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP2.6) describing the radiative forcing [17];  139 
• a maximum concentration of GHGs (LIMITS [18]; RoSE [19]; EMF27 [20]); 140 
• an emissions pathway [7] ; 141 
• a carbon budget (AMPERE  [21]).   142 
Another possible limitation in comparing the scenarios of different studies is the diverse socio-143 
economic storylines that supports scenario developments for modelling already discussed in the 144 
previous section.  145 
3.1) Pathways broadly consistent with meeting 2°C or below 146 
In this section we study pathways that are consistent with international climate policy focusing on 147 
the 2 °C temperature limits. To concentrate on temperature change we have to be able to link 148 
equilibrium temperature increase to the GHG concentration level or to the radiative forcing 149 
achieved. The ability to draw such links in a simple and transparent way in models rests on the 150 
definition of equilibrium climate sensitivity. This parameter is a critical source of uncertainty in long-151 
term temperature projections and is largely determined by internal feedback processes that amplify 152 
or dampen the influence of radiative forcing on climate. Large spread in model climate sensitivity is 153 
one major factor contributing to the range in projections of future climate changes [22]. According 154 
to the latest reviews [23], equilibrium climate sensitivity is likely in the range 2.1°C to 4.7°C and very 155 
unlikely greater than 6°C. A multi-model ensemble value is usually applied to calculate the 156 
temperature change within the models presented in the previous chapter and as a consequence the 157 
high values, high impacts but low probability climate change temperature realisations are not 158 
included in the review. 159 
Based on 2°C target studies (listed in table A-1; Appendices section) and discussed as part of [11], it 160 
seems that 500 ppm is the maximum permissible CO2-eq concentration in 2100, with emissions 161 
peaking in 2030-2035 at the latest; the later peaking dates prove less cost-effective and rely heavily 162 
on CO2 removal technologies such as bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Most of 163 
these scenarios also exhibit net negative global CO2 emissions at the end of the century.  164 
A few of these scenarios indicate an expected temperature change below 2°C in 2100 (between 1.5 165 
and 1.8°C): RCP2.6 and EMF27-450.  Generally the mean annual GHG emissions reduction rate, 166 
following the peak, is between 2 to 5% when the peak year is around 2020 [21]. Later peaking 167 
pathways will lead to larger rates of GHG emission reduction (from 6 to 8% per year) and require net 168 
negative emissions at the end of the period to comply with the target, albeit with a temporary 169 
overshoot. Although the rapid reduction in global emissions in some scenarios is technically and 170 
economically feasible within the modelling framework, political decisions, social acceptance and 171 
institutional factors will also play a major role in the real world – elements which are not part of the 172 
modelling framework, other than through the mechanism of delayed or regionally fragmented 173 
action. Focussing at national level, some examples of very rapid emissions reductions can be found 174 
in the recent past: during the 1980s France was reducing emissions at a rate of 3% per year as a 175 
result of the large-scale deployment of new nuclear power plant facilities; the UK sustained a 176 
reduction reaching 2% per year in the 1970s decade by a strong switch from coal to gas in electricity 177 
production. These examples highlight the practical rates achievable through technical changes; 178 
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however the recorded reductions lasted only a decade or less, and were at country levels as 179 
opposed to the global level required in the scenarios discussed in this paper. In the literature 180 
maximum possible global reduction rate can be extracted; for example maximum annual rates of 181 
3.5% [2] and 4.3% [24] taking into account assumptions on technological development, economic 182 
costs, and/or socio-political factors. In some scenarios analysed for this study the emission reduction 183 
rates reach 8 to 10% per year are largely exceeding these regarded as possible maximum values [7 184 
3.2) Role of low carbon technologies within the 2°C pathways. 185 
This section highlights the technologies included in the different scenarios. Table A-2 (in Appendices 186 
section) summarises some key data concerning technology development for the scenarios achieving 187 
the 2°C target. The usual approach in the majority of the projects included in this review is to use a 188 
business-as-usual or reference scenario to compare to a series of mitigation scenarios (of different 189 
levels of stringency) involving a large portfolio of technologies available at specified costs. These “full 190 
technology portfolio” scenarios usually allow strong and rapid developments in renewable or other 191 
low-carbon technologies in the power sector as well as the deployment of new technologies such as 192 
CCS. Energy efficiency improvement options in final energy demand sectors are also included, but 193 
treated as separate from the group of energy generating technologies. In these “full portfolio” 194 
modelling exercises technology cost changes over time can occur through two channels: learning-by-195 
doing (experience gained during development) or learning-by-searching (research and development 196 
activities). These improvements can induce new dynamics between technology adoptions and create 197 
divergences among model results (LIMITS and EMF27). However in most model scenarios, 198 
technology costs are specified as a set of input assumptions. 199 
In the baseline scenarios the energy demand increase is met primarily with carbon intensive fossil 200 
fuels; generally the CO2 emissions for 2050 reach 2 to 3 times the 2010 levels. Within the full 201 
technology portfolio scenarios decarbonising the electricity generation sector is one of the main 202 
approaches to achieving the targets.  The share of low-carbon generation in the electricity supply 203 
increases from 30% today to 80-100% in 2050 (depending on the stringency of the climate target). 204 
Within the total primary energy sources, low-carbon sources represent only between 60% and 70% 205 
in these scenarios highlighting the difficulty of decarbonisation of other sectors (such as transport) 206 
compared to electricity generation. Renewable technologies such as wind and solar commonly take 207 
the largest share of low-carbon electricity generation in 2050. The share of CCS in electricity 208 
generation in 2050 varies from 8% to 32%. This is partly driven by assumptions on CCS deployment, 209 
which starts in or after 2025 in all the scenarios where CCS is considered, and assumptions on 210 
deployment of renewable technologies. However this fact changes during the second half of the 211 
century when CCS technology becomes more mature and renewable generation reaches saturation; 212 
this is particularly the case in scenarios with stringent targets or overshoots when BECCS (bio energy 213 
with CCS) in the second part of the century is needed to achieve negative emissions.  214 
The pathways indicate that the energy transformations need to be initiated without delay, gain 215 
momentum rapidly, and be sustained for decades. This implies the rapid introduction of policies and 216 
fundamental governance changes toward integrating climate change into local and national policy 217 
priorities. A range of measures is required in each sector. For example, as discussed in the GEA [14], 218 
rather than aiming for buildings that use zero fossil fuel energy as quickly as possible, an 219 
economically sustainable energy strategy would implement a combination of the following: reduced 220 
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demand for energy; use of available waste heat from industrial, commercial, or decentralized 221 
electricity production; on-site generation of combined heat and electricity production; and off-site 222 
supply of electricity. Some assessments, notably the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy 223 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation [25] and the GEA [14], emphasize the great importance of 224 
accelerating demand-side efficiency and conservation measures for future reductions of GHG 225 
emissions.  226 
 227 
4) Mitigation costs implications of the 2°C target 228 
 229 
There is some variation in total energy system costs at a regional level. In 2020, overall costs are 230 
higher in high-income regions since these are required to meet their Copenhagen Accord emissions 231 
reductions. This switches after 2020, with a greater proportional cost in middle and low-income 232 
regions [26]. For middle-income regions, the rapid increases in energy-services are predominantly 233 
met through an increase in coal consumption. Given that coal consumption needs to be severely 234 
restricted in 2°C scenarios even under the availability of CCS technology [27], [28], these regions 235 
require a greater level of investment to meet the emissions reductions required. Low-carbon 236 
technologies (including CCS) are characterised by large up-front investments, and low-income 237 
regions have higher capital costs [29]. These low carbon technologies are consequently more 238 
expensive to deploy in the developing world than in the high-income regions even when factoring 239 
the lower operating and maintenance costs expected from cheaper labour costs. 240 
According to GEA [14], in order to achieve the 2°C target, at least a 60–80% share of global primary 241 
energy will need to come from zero-carbon options by 2050; the electricity sector in particular will 242 
need to be almost completely decarbonized by mid-century (low carbon shares of 75–100%). Getting 243 
to that point requires in general a complete phase-out of coal power without CCS by 2050 with 244 
strong bioenergy growth in the medium term. There is however less agreement in the contribution 245 
of natural gas or oil as a bridging or transitional technology in the short to medium term to provide 246 
back up for intermittent renewables [28]. In these scenarios nuclear energy is a choice, not a 247 
requirement. 248 
As explained in IPCC 2014 [11] and [13], substantial reductions in emissions would require large 249 
changes in investment patterns. Mitigation scenarios in which policies stabilize atmospheric 250 
concentrations (without overshoot) in the range from 430 to 530 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 lead to 251 
substantial shifts in annual investment flows during the period 2010–2029 compared to baseline 252 
scenarios. Over the period 2010 to 2029, annual investment in conventional fossil fuel technologies 253 
associated with the electricity supply sector is projected to decline by about US$ 30 (with a range of 254 
2–166) billion (median: ‐20% compared to 2010) while annual investment in low‐carbon electricity 255 
supply (i.e., renewables, nuclear and electricity generation with CCS) is projected to rise by about 256 
US$ 147 (with a range of 31–360) billion (median: +100% compared to 2010).  257 
Under climate mitigation policies fossil fuel consumption in high-income regions consequently falls, 258 
leading to downwards pressure on fossil fuel prices. Cheaper resources are therefore available to the 259 
middle and low-income countries and so there is almost no additional cost to these regions in 2020 260 
(while marginal, the change in cost is still positive), however fossil fuel exporters suffer from the 261 
variation of the price. The assumption of perfect foresight in most models means that some of the 262 
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middle and low-income regions do show some reduction in their emissions through the first half of 263 
the century (albeit at a much lower level of ambition than in high-income regions) [27], [30]. 264 
Carbon prices are assessed for the mitigation scenarios and presented in Figure 2. The carbon price 265 
tends to rise over time when emissions mitigation effort increases, reflecting that further mitigation 266 
is more expensive to achieve. The inter-model spread in carbon price increases as the required  267 
emissions reduction effort increases, because the models have different technical capabilities and 268 
costs for deep levels of mitigation. The target analysed here corresponding to temperature goals 269 
lower than 2°C is stringent and as a consequence the carbon price reported can diverge significantly 270 
amongst models within the same project. The carbon prices interquartile range for the 2°C target 271 
pathways, in the optimum case scenarios of early adoption of mitigation policy and availability of all 272 
key low-carbon technologies in the models (right panel of Figure 2), span between US$15-US$115 273 
per ton of CO2 in 2025 and increase to $100-$500 in 2050 and US$1100-US$9000 in 2100 (prices in 274 
US$2010). These values are presented for the optimal case scenarios; any delays in policy adoption 275 
or failure in one of the low-carbon technologies assumed will rapidly change and increase these 276 
prices (included in the left panel Figure 2).  277 
Some studies (for example AMPERE [31]) reported macroeconomic costs of climate change 278 
mitigation policies. Generally macroeconomic costs increase with the stringency of the target and 279 
are higher for the pledge pathways. Delayed action, in general, increases the global mitigation costs 280 
and also leads to a possible fossil fuel lock-in of the electricity system, creating large and expensive 281 
unusable assets. As such the most cost-effective scenarios to achieve the 2°C target are 282 
characterised by early mitigation creating clear signals for low-carbon technology investments and a 283 
near term peak in emissions (with the latest possible peaking dates occurring between 2025 and 284 
2030, and with peak GHG emissions in the range of 30 to 50 GtCO2-eq). In the optimal policy 285 
scenarios (AMPERE [31]), consumption losses (2010-2100) are between 0.5-3.1 percent of global 286 
GDP. The comparable range (extracted from the models that solve the three scenarios) of the early 287 
action scenarios is between 0.6-3.9 percent, and for the late action scenarios between 0.7-4.3 288 
percent. Consumption losses for the least cost pathways to reach the 2°C target in 2100, with the 289 
assumption that all mitigation technologies are available (including all major renewables, nuclear 290 
and CCS), are in the range of 2 to 6% in 2050 and 3 to 11% in 2100 relative to the no mitigation (or 291 
“business as usual”/baseline) scenarios (Table A-2). 292 
 293 
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 294 
Figure 2: Carbon price for 450ppm scenarios for 2025, 2050, 2075 and 2100 in US$2010/tCO2. Left 295 
panel: all 450ppm pathways; right panel: optimal full-technology 450pmm scenarios only. 296 
5) Can we reach the target in the case of technological failures or limitations? 297 
 298 
It was found that in order to remain under the 2°C target early action and a full portfolio of low-299 
carbon technologies is needed in order to keep global mitigation costs down.  Therefore the 300 
availability, cost and future performance of key technologies has an important role in achieving this 301 
stringent climate target. 302 
Technological challenges are studied in a series of scenarios including limitations on the availability 303 
of specific technologies or groups of technologies. The usual technology restrictions (which are 304 
assumed to follow from technical limits or political decisions to restrict technology deployment) in 305 
these alternative scenarios are: a nuclear phase out, no CCS development, reduced deployment of 306 
wind and solar because of intermittency limits, and finally reduced availability of biomass as an 307 
energy feedstock. Some scenarios are modelled with a combination of these restrictions. The results 308 
of these scenarios have been summarised in figure 3 presenting feasibility and cost of the 2°C target 309 
under restriction of specific technology: no CCS, EERE (low energy intensity, high renewable and 310 
neither CCS nor nuclear), Conv (conservative renewable availability), LowBIO (low biomass 311 
availability), LowSW (low solar and wind penetration), NoNuc (no nuclear) and finally LowEI (low 312 
energy intensity). The feasibility indicator in figure 3 is defined as the proportion of models solving 313 
the 2°C target from the total number of models in the evaluation group. 314 
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 315 
Figure 3: sensitivity on cost and feasibility to technology restriction of the 2°C target scenarios 316 
(represented: median, 25% and 75% percentile and minimum maximum) extracted from the AR5 317 
database. 318 
Widespread electrification of the end use sectors combined with strong decarbonisation of 319 
electricity production occurs in most mitigation scenarios. Non-fossil energy sources replace coal in 320 
the near term and gas in the medium-and long-term in the electricity sector.  Renewable electricity 321 
generation deployment is not by itself sufficient to achieve the required levels of electricity 322 
decarbonisation, and most of the 2°C scenarios also depend, during the second-half of the century, 323 
on the large-scale deployment of CO2 capture technologies.  In all of the scenarios the only 324 
geoengineering technology explored to mitigate climate change is bio-energy coupled with CCS 325 
(BECCS) that could results in net negative emissions during the end of the century. Particularly in 326 
scenarios with later peaking years, BECCS is therefore a critical technology, and its absence often 327 
results in an inability for models to meet the prescribed target where this is relatively stringent (i.e. 328 
consistent with 2 °C or less). 329 
Under the absence or limited availability of certain technologies the mitigation costs can increase 330 
substantially. In some cases models could not achieve concentration levels below 450ppm CO2-eq in 331 
2100 under a scenario without access to CCS. The increase in total discounted mitigation costs 332 
relative to a limitation in a low-carbon technology can reach as high as 138% in the case of CCS and 333 
64% in the case of limited access to bioenergy.  In comparison nuclear phase out increases total 334 
costs by 7% and limited access to solar and wind 6% in the case of 450 ppm CO2-eq target. These 335 
numbers show that key options for the 2°C target are biomass and successful deployment of CCS 336 
and their combination (BECCS). Nuclear or renewable (as solar and wind generation) taken 337 
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separately within pathways can be considered a policy choices but not critical technologies to 338 
achieve the stringent climate goal. 339 
Finally demand reduction can significantly reduce mitigation costs as well as the reliance on carbon 340 
capture and storage (CCS). In order to explore sensitivity of the results to demand assumptions, a 341 
scenario depicting stringent efficiency measures and behavioural changes to radically limit energy 342 
demand is explored [21] [32]. Unfortunately the demand side options are usually characterised with 343 
less detail than the supply side in the studies reviewed in this paper. Most models have a very 344 
limited accounting of demand side investments and costs [32]. The low energy intensity case, with a 345 
rate of energy intensity improvement about 50% higher than the historical rate of change, achieves 346 
the 450 ppm target with the lowest costs across all sensitivity cases and models, and it is also the 347 
only case where the target is found attainable by 90% of the models even in the case of delayed 348 
action (or near term low ambitions) pathways [21].  349 
 350 
6) What are the consequences in delaying the decision to cut emissions? 351 
 352 
Long infrastructure lifetimes mean that energy systems transition to a low carbon economy will take 353 
decades; so immediate action is needed to avoid lock-in of invested capital into existing energy 354 
systems and associated infrastructure that is not compatible with long-term climate targets [14]. 355 
Infrastructure developments and long‐lived capital stocks that lock societies into GHG‐intensive 356 
emissions pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of early 357 
action for ambitious mitigation. This lock‐in risk is compounded by the lifetime of the infrastructure, 358 
by the difference in emissions associated with alternatives, and the magnitude of the investment 359 
cost. As a result, lock‐in related to infrastructure and spatial planning is the most difficult to reduce 360 
[13].  361 
The largest threat of lock-in of technologies within the energy system regards electricity production 362 
from fossil fuel (for coal and gas) and has been considered in the case of a 2°C target following 363 
scenarios with different short term emission reduction goals within the AMPERE and the RoSE 364 
projects (Table A-2  – “delayed action”). Currently, about 90% of global primary energy supply comes 365 
from coal, oil and gas. Climate policy and pricing of CO2 emissions are likely to make some of the 366 
fossil installations unprofitable, thus resulting in premature retirement of fossil capacities before the 367 
end of their technical lifetimes. In the AMPERE project, a range of GHG emissions targets are 368 
specified (from 50 to 60 GtCO2-eq), with the long term target in all cases fixed below 2°C [27].  369 
Scenarios with higher short term targets have to rely heavily on negative emissions at the end of the 370 
century to achieve the long term goal. More importantly, with these less stringent short term targets 371 
the phase-out of coal (and gas) capacity in electricity production is delayed until after 2030 and as a 372 
consequence fossil fuel generation capacity continues to be built in the period to 2030; in this case 373 
the phase-out of coal and gas based plants, to totally decarbonise the electricity system in 2050, 374 
creates stranded capacity in the electricity generation sector. In the worst case (the highest 2030 375 
target) the stranded investment reaches globally US$ 60billion for the 2010-2030 period and almost 376 
US$ 450billion for the 2030-2050 period with a particularly large contribution from China and South 377 
Asia, which will have invested heavily in coal generation during the first period. The 2030-2050 costs 378 
for these two regions represent more than 10% of their total investment in electricity generation 379 
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during the period. To avoid these future large stranded capacities, fixing short to medium term 380 
targets on electricity generation are effective in preventing their development in the first place 381 
(targets below 53 GtCO2-eq in 2030 reduce the above costs by two thirds). Other less effective 382 
options available to avoid high costs from stranded capacity are reducing energy demand (increasing 383 
efficiency), retrofitting old coal and gas capacity with CCS (if available) and increasing the lifetime of 384 
existing coal capacity (instead of building new ones). The RoSE results for similar scenarios show that 385 
in 2030, between 600 GW and 1400 GW of fossil power generation capacity are idle in the best 386 
policy case with immediate action [33]. Early retirements peak at a higher level (up to 3,500 GW) in 387 
the delayed scenarios.   388 
A second effect of delaying mitigation policies is the impact on the fossil fuel markets. The AMPERE 389 
project reported that fossil fuel revenue presents a short term increase when a delay in mitigation 390 
decision is applied in comparison to the optimal (i.e. 2010) start of global mitigation action. These 391 
short term gains have to be compared by the longer-term effect brought by the stringent climate 392 
target and lower carbon emissions to comply with the carbon budget. In [15] models show different 393 
results; some models show a compensation between the short term gains and long term losses 394 
however in certain results the short term higher use of coal (and the possible technological lock-in) 395 
leads to strong reallocation toward oil and gas use over the rest of the century maintaining strong 396 
fossil fuel revenue gains in the long –term as well. 397 
As consequences of higher short-term GHG emissions and fossil fuel lock-in , higher CO2 prices in 398 
2050 are generated the longer the delay in implementing global emissions reductions (i.e. the later 399 
the date at which global emissions peak) and the greater the required level of emissions reductions 400 
[34]. 401 
 402 
7) Co-benefits and risks associated with climate action. 403 
 404 
Co-benefits and risks are intrinsic to mitigation options chosen for the global transformation 405 
pathways implemented. The large reduction in GHG emissions necessary to fulfil the stringent target 406 
presented in the paper has a significant effect on the energy system (from primary energy mix to 407 
final demand levels). These changes to the energy system induce secondary impacts including 408 
possible health benefits, changes to energy security or impacts on biodiversity [35]. These effects are 409 
challenging to weight against the costs of mitigation as they apply to different systems (economic, 410 
social and environmental) and are measured in different units. Some integrated assessment models 411 
such as PAGE [36] or FUND [37] amalgamate some of these side-effects in a relatively simple manner 412 
to the global economic impact of the pathways but debates arise from the materialisation of such 413 
side-effects into monetary quantities. Within a small number of the studies included in the review 414 
two co-benefits to mitigation scenarios are reported: impacts on air pollution and energy security. 415 
Impacts on global air quality 416 
The impact on air pollution is reported in AMPERE [38] and the RCPs scenarios [39] as avoided 417 
emissions of NOx and SO2, two important precursors to air quality pollutants: ozone and particulate 418 
matters. These two pollutants have negative impacts on human health, crop production and building 419 
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preservation. The reduction in emitted quantities is reported due exclusively to climate 420 
considerations – no air quality policies are included. For mitigation scenarios achieving a 421 
concentration of 450ppm CO2-eq, the models show strong reductions in NOx (for example 60% 422 
below the baseline in 2050 for RCP 2.6) and more modest reductions for SO2 (for example 20% 423 
below the baseline for RCP2.6). However, no direct effects on health and morbidity or on crop 424 
production are directly reported within the studies. 425 
Impacts on energy security 426 
Energy security is analysed for the mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline energy system. The 427 
reported information is orientated toward the qualitative analysis of energy system security. Within 428 
the RoSE project, study shows that mitigation policies in general increase national energy sufficiency 429 
and resilience via an increase and diversification of energy sources and carriers [40]. The 450ppm 430 
scenarios show radical reductions in energy trade (to almost zero in one for the models in the 431 
ensemble - WITCH), whilst energy diversity rises to mid-century, then declines as renewables start to 432 
dominate, although some regions’ dependence on imported oil could increase if unconventional 433 
sources are not exploited in mitigation scenarios. However it is also remarked that the potential 434 
domination of the electricity sector by solar or the liquid fuel sector by biofuels may increase 435 
vulnerability. In LIMITS the analysis is primary focussed on the national level where energy security 436 
concerns are more relevant.  The climate policy scenarios are combined with large reductions in 437 
fossil fuel dependence (and as a consequence imports) that increases energy security after 2030 at 438 
the regional level in major economy blocks [41].  439 
Other impacts of mitigation options 440 
Other potential side-effects from the climate mitigation scenarios have been highlighted in the 441 
assessments reports such as IPCC 2014 [13]; these include biodiversity and land use changes, water 442 
consumption, employment. No precise assessments have been found in the projects analysed. 443 
 444 
  445 
8. Conclusion  446 
This review paper summarises the characteristics of possible long-term transformation pathways of 447 
GHG emissions aimed toward stabilisation of climate change below the 2°C temperature target by 448 
the end of the century. The modelled scenarios indicate that it is still achievable.  A large number of 449 
scenarios assessed share common views: mitigation to 2°C or below requires early action to keep 450 
costs down; at least a 60–80% share of global primary energy will need to come from zero-carbon 451 
options by 2050; the electricity sector in particular will need to be almost completely decarbonized 452 
by mid-century (low carbon shares of 75–100%); achieving a complete decarbonisation of the 453 
electricity sector will require a full portfolio of technologies.  In particular, BECCS will be needed to 454 
achieve negative emissions later in the decade and coal power without CCS will need to be 455 
completely phased out by 2050; delays or removal of key technologies makes the requisite levels of 456 
mitigation harder to achieve and / or more costly. 457 
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However, a number of features of the models result in scenario “infeasibility” for some models. 458 
These include scenarios in which regional mitigation action remains relatively weak (in line with the 459 
less ambitious end of Cancun pledges) until 2030, before global coordinated mitigation action aimed 460 
at limiting atmospheric concentrations of GHGs to 450 ppm takes hold. Infeasibility also results from 461 
scenarios in which key low-carbon energy technologies, notably CCS with power generation, are not 462 
included in the technology mix. In this sense, model infeasibility means that the models do not have 463 
sufficient low-carbon technology options to provide a solution to the problem of meeting the 464 
world’s future energy needs (as derived from exogenous assumptions on economic growth, 465 
population growth and the elasticity of energy end-use demand to these factors) without exceeding 466 
a specified level of GHG emissions. Even in models which do meet the feasibility criterion, the 467 
consequences of delayed action are stark, with hundreds of fossil generation plants scrapped before 468 
the end of their useful lifetimes, and increased costs relative to an “optimal” scenario in which 469 
action began in the model base year (in most cases 2010).  470 
As explained in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report [13], the integrated assessment models cannot 471 
define feasibility – they can only indicate it in terms of economic and technical factors. In reality the 472 
feasibility of stringent mitigation scenarios may be even lower as a result of societal and political 473 
barriers not represented in the models. Hence, the latest scenarios indicate that there is now an 474 
increasing risk that – under realistic assumptions where global coordinated mitigation action does 475 
not begin for several years - the achievement of 2 ° C is no longer realistically a feasible prospect. 476 
Furthermore, although there is emerging research that aims to further assess feasibility in terms of 477 
comparing required future low-carbon technology deployment rates with historical energy 478 
technology deployment rates, there is still much to be done to understand more accurately how 479 
important societal, institutional and political factors are to the lock-in of current fossil energy 480 
systems.  481 
Considering the actions that would enhance the feasibility of achieving an emissions reduction 482 
trajectory in line with the 2 ° C target, it is clear from recent scenarios that energy efficiency is not 483 
just a low-cost option, but a risk-management strategy as well, where the specific risk is that there is 484 
a failure to be able to deploy a major low-carbon technology (such as CCS or large penetrations of 485 
intermittent renewables such as wind and solar). The enhanced energy efficiency cases in most 486 
models not only reduce the mitigation cost relative to the standard mitigation case, but allow the 487 
achievement of the 2 ° C target even when key technologies are excluded from the low-carbon set of 488 
options. As such, an enhanced focus on policies that drive rapid energy efficiency improvements is 489 
one of the most important near-term actions for governments. In addition, the criticality of 490 
deploying CCS to keep mitigation costs manageable and to allow the possibility of negative emissions 491 
in the latter half of the century cannot be overstated. As such, another key policy implication of 492 
these scenarios is the need to continue with demonstration projects until commercial-scale CCS is 493 
realised. A further policy implication is the need to plan and manage the inevitable shift from 494 
unabated coal and gas power stations that is likely to be necessary if mitigation action is further 495 
delayed, which will result in the early retirement of a number of such plants. Policies which can 496 
accommodate the complex distributional dynamics of this write-off of high-carbon assets will need 497 
careful preparation and stakeholder engagement. 498 
Finally, GHG emission reductions are a source of possible co-benefits, which has not always been 499 
quantified in monetary terms. These co-benefits include air quality, health benefits, sustainable 500 
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development, and green employment.  Moreover, under higher levels of warming, systems such as 501 
the climate or the natural environment may be affected by large amplifying feedbacks that could 502 
trigger tipping points and extreme events. Taking into account these strong feedbacks and possible 503 
high damages from changing climate could be important for high-end scenarios such as, in general, 504 
the “business as usual” case used as a reference to calculate consumption losses due to climate 505 
mitigation policies. In most studies the baseline or BAU is assumed to see GDP grow continuously to 506 
2100, unaffected by climate damages.  507 
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 650 
Appendices: 651 
Table A-1: physical climatic parameters for the pathways by studies. 652 
Study / 
scenario 
GHG 
concentration 
in 2100 
Temperature 
change above 
pre-industrial by 
2100 
GHG pathway: 
peak year &level 
2100 level 
Rate of emissions 
reduction after peak 
EMF27 450 450ppm 
1.5-1.8°C  (target 
on RF=2.6 Wm-2) 
2025=20to35 GtCO2eq 
2100=-20to0 GtCO2 
2020-30=2.8,2030-
40=5.3,2040-
50=5.2%/y mean 
ensemble 
LIMITS FP7 
450ppm 
450ppm 1.7±0.1°C 
2020=53±1 GtCO2eq 
2100=0±1 GtCO2 
2020-30=2.8,2030-
40=5.3,2040-
50=5.2%/y mean 
ensemble 
EMF27 G8 480 to 500ppm 1.8-2.3°C 
2020to2030=25to35 
GtCO2eq  
2100=0to20 GtCO2 
Not specified 
LIMITS FP7 
500ppm 
500ppm 1.9±0.15°C 
2020=53±1 GtCO2eq 
2100=1±1 GtCO2 
2020-30=2.7,2030-
40=3.8,2040-
50=4.2%/y mean 
ensemble 
AMPERE 450 
immediate 
action 
450ppm 
1.9°C (1.7–2.5) 
probablity 
>2°C=36% 
2020=45±5 GtCO2eq 
2100=2±2 GtCO2eq 
2030-50=4%/y mean 
ensemble (3 to 4.5) 
RCP 2.6 427ppm 
1.9°C (0.9-2.3°C 
min to max range 
CMIP5) 
2020= 37.6 GtCO2 
2100=-1.5 GtCO2 
Not specified 
RoSE 
Immediate 
action 
450ppm  
2°C with 50% 
chance 
2010= 45 GtCO2eq, 
(one model peaks in 
2035, at 50Gt CO2eq) 
1 to 3%/y 
RoSE 
delayed 
action to 
2020 
450ppm  
2°C with 50% 
chance 
2020=50-57 GtCO2eq 
2100=5 GtCO2eq 
Not specified 
RoSE 
delayed 
action to 
2030 
450ppm  
2°C with 50% 
chance 
2030=55-65GtCO2eq 
2100=0-5 GtCO2eq 
10%/y between 3030-
2040 (maximum rate) 
AMPERE 450 
delayed 
action 
450ppm 
2.1°C (2.0–2.5) 
probability 
>2°C=60% 
2020to2030=45±5 
GtCO2eq 
2100=0±2 GtCO2eq 
2030-50=7.5%/y mean 
ensemble (6.5 to 8.5) 
UNEP 
Emissions 
Gap Report 
2013 
highest 450ppm 
Target 2°C with 
likely chance 
>66%  
2010-2020=36to47 
GtCO2eq2100:1/3mod
els negative emissions 
2030-2050=2to4.5%/y 
(late action=6to8.5%/y) 
22 
 
UNEP 
Emissions 
Gap Report 
2013 
highest 450ppm 
Target 2° C with 
medium chance 
(50to66%) 
2010-2020=44to49 
GtCO2eq 
2100:1/3models 
negative emissions 
Not specified 
UNEP 
Emissions 
Gap Report 
2013 
highest 450ppm 
Target 1.5°C with 
medium chance 
(50to66%) 
2010-2020=37to44 
GtCO2eq  
2100:few scenarios 
negative emissions 
2030-2050=2to4.5%/y 
(late action=6to8.5%/y) 
Global 
Energy 
Assessment 
Not available 
2°C with at least 
50% chance 
2020 Peak year.  
Negative in 2100. 
Not specified 
CCC2013-
UCL 
440ppm 2° C 
2016=36 GtCO2. 
2100=5.0 GtCO2 
4.00% 
CCC2013-
UCL 
450ppm 2.1° C 
2025=41GtCO2. 39.9 
GtCO2 
2100=5.0 GtCO2 in  
4.50% 
CCC2013-
UCL 
465ppm 2.15° C 
2025=41GtCO2.  
2100=5.6 GtCO2 
2.00% 
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Study / model 
/ scenario 
Share of 
fossil fuels 
in primary 
energy by 
2050, 2100 
GW deployed of key technologies 
(solar, wind, CCS, nuclear) 
Change in 
energy 
intensity of 
GDP, 2011-
2050 
Consumption 
losses in 2020, 
2030, 2050, 2100 
Reduction in primary 
energy relative to 
baseline by 2050/2100 
EMF27 450 N/A 
S=30 (10to35), W=33 (20to35), 
N=67 (11to214) EJ/y 
Renewable electricity: =32% (28 to 
36) / 55% (40 to 60) & Non-
Electricity RE =6% (4 to 8) / 22% (10 
to 26) & Nuclear electricity = 18% 
15 to 50% 
rel. to BAU 
0.8 to3.2 %  loss 
(cumulative 2010-
2100 with 5% 
discount rate) + 
one model 11.7% 
N/A 
LIMITS 450 
ppm 
N/A 
2010-30(25,60,15,25);2030-
50(170,140,105,45)GW/y 
N/A 
Cumulative 2010-
2050: $45trillion 
comp to base 
N/A 
AMPERE 450 
immediate 
action 
N/A 
Renewable share of primary energy 
2050=30%, 2100=55% 
N/A 
0.6 to 4 % loss 
(cumulative 2010-
2100 with 5% 
discount rate) 
N/A 
RCP 2.6 
30% (2050) 
10% (2100) 
 
N/A 
N/A 
0.3% (2020) 
0.9% (2030) 
1.7% (2050) 
0.8% (2100) 
Primary energy reduced 
20% compared to 
baseline in 2100 
RoSE 450 ppm 
immediate 
action 
54-61% 
(2050) 
18-23% 
(2100) 
Up to 240 EJ/year of nuclear in 
2100 
Up to 106 EJ/year of fossil with CCS 
in 2100 
Up to 300 EJ/year biomass (of 
which 195 EJ/year with CCS) in 
2100 
Up to 285 EJ/year of solar in 2100 
2.0-2.6% 
per year to 
2050 
1.4-2.5% GDP loss 
cumulatively over 
the period to 
2100 
23-45% below BAU 
(2050) 
 
32-52% below BAU 
(2100) 
 
RoSE 450 ppm 
delayed 
action to 2020 
50-61% 
(2050) 
15-22% 
(2100) 
Up to 240 EJ/year of nuclear in 
2100 
Up to 97 EJ/year of fossil with CCS 
in 2100 
Up to 290 EJ/year biomass (of 
which 195 EJ/year with CCS) in 
2100 
Up to 275 EJ/year of solar in 2100 
2.0-2.7% 
per year to 
2050 
1.5-2.5% GDP loss 
cumulatively over 
the period to 
2100 
23-47% below BAU 
(2050) 
 
36-53% below BAU 
(2100) 
23 
 
RoSE 450 ppm 
delayed 
action to 2030 
42-58% 
(2050) 
10-20% 
(2100) 
Up to 130 EJ/year of wind in 2100 
Up to 257 EJ/year of nuclear in 
2100 
Up to 280 EJ/year of biomass in 
2100 (of which up to 196 EJ/year 
with CCS) 
Up to 309 EJ/year of solar in 2100 
2.0-2.9% 
per year to 
2050 
1.7-2.9% GDP loss  
cumulatively over 
the period to 
2100 
25-50% below BAU 
(2050) 
 
34-54% below BAU 
(2100) 
AMPERE 450 
delayed 
action 
N/A 
Renewable share of primary 
2050=18% (≈2010) / 2100=65%  
N/A 0.5 to 3.7 % N/A 
GEA 2012 N/A 
Nuclear 75-1850 GW in 2050. 
Renewable (164-651 EJ) 30-75% of 
primary energy in 2050. 
1.5-2.2% 
annually to 
2050 
N/A N/A 
CCC 2013-UCL: 
440ppm 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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